Fordham Law Review
Volume 88

Issue 5

Article 5

2020

Economic Inequality, Access to Law, and Mandatory Arbitration
Agreements: A Comment on the Standard Conception of the
Lawyer’s Role
Sung Hui Kim
UCLA School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Digital
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Legal Ethics and Professional
Commons
Responsibility Commons
Network
Logo

Recommended Citation
Sung Hui Kim, Economic Inequality, Access to Law, and Mandatory Arbitration Agreements: A Comment
on the Standard Conception of the Lawyer’s Role, 88 Fordham L. Rev. 1665 (2020).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol88/iss5/5

This Colloquium is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship
and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

ECONOMIC INEQUALITY, ACCESS TO LAW, AND
MANDATORY ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS: A
COMMENT ON THE STANDARD CONCEPTION
OF THE LAWYER’S ROLE
Sung Hui Kim*
INTRODUCTION
Since Richard Wasserstrom’s seminal article almost fifty years ago,1
academics have debated the propriety of the model that purports to guide the
professional responsibility of lawyers—widely referred to as the “standard
conception of the lawyer’s role.”2 This model combines the principles of
“partisanship” and “neutrality.”3 Partisanship requires lawyers to promote
the interests of their clients vigorously within the bounds of the law.4
Neutrality requires lawyers to subordinate their moral concerns to those of
the client and maintains that only the client is entitled to make moral choices.5
In return, the lawyer is released from moral responsibility for any lawful ends
achieved or lawful means used.6 As Wasserstrom explained, this model
effectively licenses the lawyer to act as an “amoral technician” for the client:
Once a lawyer represents a client, the lawyer has a duty to make his or her
expertise fully available in the realization of the end sought by the client,
irrespective . . . of the moral worth to which the end will be put or the
character of the client who seeks to utilize it. Provided that the end sought
is not illegal, the lawyer is, in essence, an amoral technician whose peculiar

* Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. This Article was prepared for the Colloquium on
Corporate Lawyers, hosted by the Fordham Law Review and the Stein Center for Law and
Ethics on October 11, 2019, at Fordham University School of Law. The author is grateful for
comments from: Rick Abel, Sameer Ashar, Miriam Baer, Bruce Green, Claire Hill, Cathy
Hwang, Russell Pearce, Stephen Pepper, Eli Wald, David Yosifon, and the other workshop
participants.
1. See generally Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues,
5 HUM. RTS. 1 (1975).
2. Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV.
63, 73 (1980) (referring to the “standard conception of the lawyer’s role”).
3. Id. at 73–74; William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and
Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 36–38; cf. Murray L. Schwartz, The
Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 669, 674 (1978) (referring
to “professionalism” and “nonaccountability” principles).
4. See Postema, supra note 2, at 73.
5. See id.
6. See id.
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skills and knowledge in respect to the law are available to those with whom
the relationship of client is established.7

While Wasserstrom and others were troubled by the implications of the
standard conception, some celebrated and defended the standard conception,
insisting that a good lawyer, acting according to it, can be a good person.
Some of these commentators advanced justifications of the standard
conception, including its principle of neutrality, which were grounded in the
value of autonomy.8 Although details among the various accounts differed,
they largely embraced the view that the principle of neutrality was necessary
to safeguard client autonomy. They argued that the autonomy of individuals
could only be fully realized if they were able to fully exercise their legal
rights. In our society, legal rights are realistically only accessible through a
lawyer; accordingly, when lawyers foreclose or delimit access to legal
services by—for example—refusing to assist in legally permissible but
immoral projects, they are not only depriving clients of full and equal access
to the law but also impairing clients’ autonomy.
This Article contends that these autonomy-based defenses of the standard
conception cannot withstand the “economic inequality” objection.
According to this objection, the moral worthiness of lawyering under the
standard conception cannot be reconciled with a legal system that is so
marred by gross economic inequality such that only the wealthy have access
to lawyers. It can also not be reconciled with the fact that the wealthy
routinely use lawyers to undermine the public interest and exploit others who
cannot afford lawyers. After examining responses to the economic inequality
objection, this Article concludes that these responses do not take seriously
how economic inequality can interact with the principle of neutrality to
exacerbate inequality. Specifically, they fail to consider the possibility that
lawyers, acting according to the principle of neutrality, will foreclose others’
access to lawyers (and thereby the law) and undermine their autonomy—the
very value that underwrites these defenses.
The foreclosure of access to lawyers that this Article cites to is neither
merely hypothetical nor an aberrational outcome of idiosyncratic lawyering.
It is the systemic reality already faced by the approximately sixty million
employees who are subject to employer-promulgated predispute mandatory
arbitration agreements imposed as a condition of new or continuing
employment in nonunion workplaces. These agreements require employees
to waive their right to file all statutory and common-law employment-related
claims in court even before they have or know they have claims. As will be
detailed below, the most far-reaching consequence of these agreements is
that they make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for employees to find

7. Wasserstrom, supra note 1, at 5–6.
8. See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS
(5th ed. 2016); Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the LawyerClient Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976); Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical
Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613.
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lawyers willing to represent them at all, even if they have legitimate, legally
cognizable complaints.
Part I examines some of the leading autonomy-based defenses of the
standard conception and its principle of neutrality and their responses to the
economic inequality objection. It argues that these defenses rely on woefully
incomplete characterizations of lawyer-client relationships and their impact.
By emphasizing the discreteness of the lawyer-client relationship and the
empowering potential of legal services, they ignore the fact that lawyers not
only facilitate clients’ life goals but also facilitate the victimization of third
persons, some of whom lack access to lawyers and therefore cannot redress
that victimization. As a result, these defenses underappreciate how the
principle of neutrality will interact with economic inequality to reproduce
and even aggravate the socioeconomic imbalances that plague the market for
legal services.
Part II provides one concrete example of how the principle of neutrality
can interact with economic inequality to exacerbate inequality. It shows how
the neutrality principle has already operated in the employment context to
deprive sixty million employees of their access to lawyers, making it
impossible for these employees to vindicate their employment-related rights
in any forum. It argues that lawyers—who act according to the neutrality
principle by facilitating the imposition of mandatory arbitration agreements
on behalf of their employer-clients—are foreclosing employees’ access to
lawyers and the law, which undermines their autonomy and impinges on the
value that the defenders of the standard conception claim to embrace.9
Part III further examines the impact of mandatory arbitration agreements
on employees and argues that what is being countenanced is far worse than
merely trading off one individual’s autonomy for another’s. It argues that,
when lawyers facilitate the promulgation of mandatory arbitration
agreements for their employer-clients, they are promoting a weaker form of
autonomy by depriving employees of a more fundamental form of autonomy.
Specifically, lawyers are promoting employers’ freedom to make unimpeded
choices at the expense of employees’ freedom from domination and
subordination at the hands of their employers.
I. NEUTRALITY AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY
The standard conception of the lawyer’s role has been defended by many
prominent academics.
Perhaps the most notable autonomy-based
justification was advanced in 1976 by Charles Fried, who grappled with the
conception’s troubling implications, as previously raised by Wasserstrom.10
Analogizing the lawyer-client relationship to that of friendship, Fried
observed that the moral right to choose and prefer friends “is a product of our
9. While there are numerous contexts in which private arbitration is the forum of choice
for resolving disputes (e.g., consumer contracts), due to the fundamental nature of the relevant
legal rights involved and the magnitude of the stakes for individual claimants, this Article will
only address mandatory arbitration agreements in the employment context.
10. See generally Fried, supra note 8.

1668

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

individual autonomy”11 and is integral to preserving the fundamental moral
interests of “personality, identity, and liberty.”12 Fried then argued that the
same value of autonomy supported the role of “legal friend” and morally
justified the client’s access to lawyers and the client’s “right . . . to receive
such an extra measure of care (without regard . . . to considerations of
efficiency or fairness).”13 He noted:
[A]t the very least the law must leave us a measure of autonomy, whether
or not it is in the social interest to do so. . . . It is because the law must
respect the rights of individuals that the law must also create and support
the specific role of legal friend. For the social nexus—the web of perhaps
entirely just institutions—has become so complex that without the
assistance of an expert adviser an ordinary layman cannot exercise that
autonomy which the system must allow him.14

Accordingly, “[t]he lawyer acts morally because he helps to preserve and
express the autonomy of his client vis-à-vis the legal system.”15 On Fried’s
account, so long as the lawyer’s assistance remains lawful and does not
involve so-called personal wrongs, such as lying, cheating, and
humiliation,16 lawyers are morally justified in servicing their clients,
regardless of whether third persons suffer an injustice or the representation
is contrary to the public interest.17
Almost a decade later, Stephen L. Pepper defended the lawyer’s “amoral
ethical role”18 and, in particular, the principle of neutrality on similar
grounds. Pepper maintained that law was a public good because it facilitated
the private attainment of individual or group goals, which increased
individual autonomy, and that increasing autonomy was “morally good.”19
Pepper further observed that “in a highly legalized society such as ours,”
access to law “is available only through a lawyer.”20 Therefore, so long as
lawyers were facilitating “conduct which . . . [was] not unlawful,” they were
indeed promoting a “social good.”21 Conversely, if individual lawyers were
permitted to constrain their legal services based on their moral consciences,
then the legal profession would not only be infringing on the autonomy of
clients but also facilitating unequal access to the law.22 Accordingly, Pepper

11. Id. at 1074.
12. Id. at 1068.
13. Id. at 1073–74.
14. Id. at 1073.
15. Id. at 1074.
16. Id. at 1080–86 (distinguishing between “personal” and “institutional” wrongs).
17. See id. at 1080 (noting that “the legal system . . . must at times allow that autonomy
to be exercised in ways that do not further the public interest”).
18. See generally Pepper, supra note 8.
19. Id. at 616–17.
20. Id. at 617.
21. Id.
22. See id. at 617–18.
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supported the adoption of a disciplinary rule that would limit lawyers’
discretion to opt out of clients’ immoral but legally permissible plans.23
Likewise, Monroe Freedman and Abbe Smith affirmed neutrality on
autonomy grounds.24 They argued that “[t]he lawyer, by virtue of her
training and skills, has a monopoly over access to the legal system and
knowledge about the law. Consequently, the lawyer’s advice and assistance
are often indispensable to the effective exercise of individual autonomy.”25
Therefore, once a lawyer-client relationship has been formed, “the lawyer’s
devotion and zeal cannot be tempered by moral judgments of the client or of
the client’s cause.”26 If lawyers “preempt [clients’] moral decisions, or . . .
depriv[e] them of the ability to carry out their lawful decisions,” lawyers are
acting “unprofessionally and immorally” and “depriv[ing] clients of [their]
autonomy.”27 However, Freedman and Smith make an exception to the
neutrality principle in one situation: the “lawyer can be ‘called to account’
and is not ‘beyond reproof’ for the decision to accept a particular client or
cause.”28 That decision is a “moral decision for which the lawyer can
properly be held morally accountable.”29
To be clear, the foregoing accounts do support lawyers’ expressing their
own morality. They permit, and even encourage, moral dialogue between
lawyers and clients.30 However, they all agree that, where the lawyer and the
client have reached an impasse on moral issues, the lawyer must and should
accede to the client’s lawful wishes.
There are many grounds on which to criticize these autonomy-based
defenses of the standard conception and its principle of neutrality. As others
have argued, these accounts improperly conflate the moral desirability of
acting autonomously—i.e., without interference or coercion—with the moral
desirability of the autonomous act itself.31 For example, it may be “good” in
one sense that a sixteen-year-old girl was not coerced by others into marrying
a forty-year-old man (which is still legal in some states). But that is a separate
question from whether her decision to enter into the marriage is good—from

23. See Stephen L. Pepper, A Rejoinder to Professors Kaufman and Luban, 1986 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 657, 659 [hereinafter Pepper, Rejoinder] (“A background assumption
accompanying the first-class citizenship model is that it can support an enforceable
professional ethic, that it can be embodied in legal rules.”). It is unclear whether Pepper still
holds this view. See Stephen L. Pepper, Integrating Morality and Law in Legal Practice: A
Reply to Professor Simon, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1011, 1018 (2010) [hereinafter Pepper,
Integrating Morality] (noting that if the lawyer is unwilling to facilitate a morally wrongful
result, “she can refuse to assist”).
24. See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 8, at 62.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 52.
27. Id. at 62.
28. Id. at 75.
29. Id. at 70.
30. See id. at 75; Fried, supra note 8, at 1088; Pepper, Integrating Morality, supra note
23, at 1016–18.
31. See David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper, 1986
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 637, 639.
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a moral, social, or psychological perspective—or, alternatively, whether it is
good as a public policy matter to allow child marriage.
The narrow purpose of this Article, however, is to revisit one objection
that has been made against the standard conception—the “economic
inequality” objection.
According to this objection, the moral
praiseworthiness of the standard conception cannot be reconciled with a legal
system where wealth determines access to counsel and where the interests of
those affected by the outcome of negotiations or litigation often go
unrepresented.32 Because the market for legal services is so tainted by
inaccessibility and inequality, one cannot assume (as defenses of the standard
conception tend to) that justice is done and that the public interest is served
when lawyers adhere to the principles of partisanship and neutrality.
Furthermore, injustice is often compounded because rich clients routinely use
legal services to “avoid their obligations in justice” and to “perpetuate their
(legal) domination of the very groups whose greater needs these lawyers
should be meeting.”33 In short, the maldistribution of legal services resulting
from gross economic inequality vitiates the moral justifications of the
standard conception.
Defenders of the standard conception, who have responded to the
economic inequality objection, have generally insisted that the problem of
economic inequality cannot speak to the morality of the lawyer’s work for
her client and, accordingly, those two issues should be segregated. For
example, Fried readily acknowledged the problem of the “maldistribution of
a scarce resource, the aid of counsel.”34 Nevertheless, Fried concluded,
“legal counsel—like medical care—must be considered a good, and . . . he
Further, Fried insisted,
who provides it does a useful thing.”35
maldistribution “in no way questions that conclusion.”36 After all, “[t]he
lawyer-client relation is a personal relation” and “the creature of moral right”;
the relation is born of clients’ needs and exists to secure a “measure of
autonomy” for the client.37 Continuing with the analogy of medical care,
Fried contended:
If I have a client with legal needs, then neither another person with greater
needs nor a court should be able to compel or morally oblige me to
compromise my care for those needs. To hold differently would apply the
concept of battlefield emergency care (triage) to the area of regular legal
service. But doctors do not operate that way and neither should lawyers.38

32. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN
AMERICA 281 (1976).
33. Fried, supra note 8, at 1062 (characterizing the objection).
34. Id. at 1076–77.
35. Id. at 1077.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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Therefore, on Fried’s account, “considerations of efficiency or fair
distribution cannot be allowed to weaken” the lawyer-client relation, and “it
is the client’s needs which hold the reins—legally and morally.”39
Similarly, Pepper insisted that the problem of unequal access to legal
services remained a separate issue from the morality of the lawyer’s
representation of the client. He noted, “[l]ike almost everything else in our
society, access to law is rationed through the market—in this case, the market
for lawyers’ services.”40 He continued:
[T]here are two issues here: the distribution of legal services and the
content of what is distributed. The moral content of what is distributed—
the ethical nature of the lawyer-client relationship once established—is the
subject of this essay. The distribution of access to the law (legal services)
is a different subject.41

In conclusion, Pepper denied that the problem of unequal access to the law
could ever generate reasons to support morally constrained lawyering: “To
suggest that transforming the amoral facilitator role of the lawyer into the
judge/facilitator role follows from the insufficient availability of legal
services is a non sequitur.”42
The problem with these responses is that one can no more cabin off
unequal access to the law in determining whether and how to constrain the
provision of legal services than one can cabin off unequal bargaining power
in determining whether to enforce contracts of adhesion. Another analogy
can be drawn from the absurd notion that one can ignore how economic
power is distributed when attempting to reform our current dysfunctional
political and constitutional system, including our system of campaign
finance.43 The legal system and the legal services market are no less skewed
by the intractable problem of economic inequality than our socioeconomic
and political systems are. To defend a moral (or amoral) framework of legal
ethics without accounting for the radically unequal economic and social
power that comprise the background conditions under which legal services
are delivered is to retreat into the empty formalism that legal realists have
long criticized. To put it bluntly, the legal system does not exist in a vacuum.
Also, these responses to the economic inequality objection rely on a
skewed characterization of lawyer-client relationships. They emphasize the
client’s vulnerability and overdependence on the lawyer and exclude
scenarios in which clients dominate lawyers or lawyers are financially
dependent on clients. For example, by invoking the doctor,44 Fried skillfully
insinuated the image of an individual in adversity who needs a professional’s
care and attention. This image suppresses our instinct to constrain or ration
39. Id.
40. Pepper, supra note 8, at 619.
41. Id. at 619–20.
42. Id. at 620.
43. See generally Kate Andrias, Separations of Wealth: Inequality and the Erosion of
Checks and Balances, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 419 (2015).
44. See supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text.
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the scarce resource. But this image is misleading. As Rick Abel has
remarked about a similar image, it
obscures the fact that lawyers devote most of their efforts to counseling
business enterprises about familiar, repetitive situations, seeking to
facilitate future transactions in which gain, not need, is the motive and in
which only the economic interests of large corporate entities are at stake,
not individual property, much less freedom or life.45

Fried’s analogy also ignores a key distinction between the nature of
medical and legal services. A doctor’s care for her patient—typically, by
examining the patient and then prescribing treatment—will rarely generate
direct, concrete harms to third persons. In the unusual case where treatment
of a patient leads directly to the harm of others—for example, repairing the
hand of someone who then uses it to abuse her spouse—the doctor will rarely
anticipate or even know about the harm. By contrast, lawyers routinely
perform or facilitate acts in which lawyers knowingly, and sometimes
intentionally, inflict harms (justified or not) on third persons. The point is
that, unlike doctors, lawyers often find themselves in positions where they
can actually take action that might avert or minimize harm to third persons.
Similarly, Pepper’s framing of the lawyer-client relationship obscures the
fact that lawyers knowingly inflict harms on third persons. This obfuscation
is achieved through repeated, overly benign characterizations of law as an
instrument by which an individual (or group) can attain her (or their) life
goals. For example, in defending the “premise . . . that law is a public good,”
Pepper observed:
“[L]awmakers” . . . ha[ve] created various mechanisms to ease and enable
the private attainment of individual or group goals. The corporate form of
enterprise, the contract, the trust, the will, and access to civil court to gain
the use of public force for the settlement of private grievance are all
vehicles of empowerment for the individual or group . . . . In addition to
these structuring mechanisms are vast amounts of law, knowledge of which
is intended to be generally available and is empowering: landlord/tenant
law, labor law, OSHA, Social Security . . . . Access to both forms of law
increases one’s ability to successfully attain goals.46

By highlighting the lawyer’s role in helping clients reach their goals,
Pepper emphasized the discreteness of the lawyer-client relationship, as well
as the empowering potential of legal services. It is thus not surprising that,
when Pepper addressed the economic inequality objection, he assumed that
the plight of the have-nots who are unable to pursue their own goals cannot
be helped by insisting that lawyers for the haves change the way they serve
their clients.47 On Pepper’s account, it would seem to be an exercise of
45. Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV. 639,
677–78 (1981).
46. Pepper, supra note 8, at 616.
47. For purposes of this Article, the haves are elite individuals and large organizations
who tend to have greater power, wealth, status, and access to lawyers than the have-nots. See
generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974). Pepper might reply that his defense of
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futility to ask lawyers for the haves to forbear and to level the playing field
for the sake of the have-nots. It would be akin to telling higher-achieving
students to study less so that lower-achieving students can catch up.
But if we zoom out from this image of the discrete and detached lawyerclient relationship, we can more easily visualize an alternative framing of the
lawyer-client relationship—one that is much less atomistic and that exposes
the destructive potential of legal services. That framing more fully
acknowledges that the lives of the haves and the have-nots intersect in
complex, often troubling ways.48 In fact, the plight of the have-nots can
actually depend on how lawyers for the haves provide their legal assistance.
Indeed, some of the have-nots seeking lawyers need them not because they
have grand plans to execute or big life goals to reach but because they have
been wronged or victimized by one of the haves (whose lawyers facilitated
the victimization).49 Therefore, the have-nots require legal help either to
remediate the wrong or to stop further victimization. In other words,
sometimes the have-nots are the hapless third parties who have been harmed
by the lawyer-have relationship.
Moreover, situations where haves and have-nots directly interact in
problematic ways are not exactly rare. Just think about the ubiquity of
landlord-tenant, employer-employee, health insurer–insured, retailerconsumer, and manufacturer-consumer relationships. And intersections are
not confined to relationships of contractual privity. Think about how the
have-nots are disproportionately impacted by environmental pollutants
generated from well-counseled, large-scale businesses or how the have-nots
are affected when the public fisc is chronically depressed because lawyers
have helped billionaires successfully dodge taxes.
Given how commonplace such intersections are, it is reasonable (and thus
not a non sequitur)50 to implore lawyers for the haves to exercise restraint
and avoid placing the have-nots in situations where they need lawyers but
cannot access them. By refusing to forbear and, instead, assisting immoral
(but legally permissible) plans, lawyers for the haves can aggravate the
economic, social, and psychological standing of the have-nots. In doing so,
lawyers are exacerbating the consequences of economic inequality and
assaulting the very value of autonomy that underwrites defenses of the
standard conception.
In sum, the foregoing autonomy-based defenses of the standard conception
and its principle of neutrality cannot withstand the economic inequality
neutrality was not intended for the corporate client. But that claim would be tough to square
with his explicit references to corporations and groups. See Pepper, supra note 8, at 616
(referring to the “private attainment of . . . group goals” and “corporate form of enterprise”);
id. at 622–23 (citing the example of Sears’s in-house lawyer drafting form consumer contracts
covering consumer-plaintiffs).
48. Cf. Eli Wald & Russell G. Pearce, Being Good Lawyers: A Relational Approach to
Law Practice, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 601, 612–37 (2016) (rejecting the extreme
individualist/atomistic approach to legal ethics in favor of a relational approach).
49. See, e.g., infra Part II.
50. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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objection. These defenses rely on woefully incomplete characterizations of
lawyer-client relationships and their impact.
By emphasizing the
discreteness of the lawyer-client relationship and the empowering potential
of legal services, they ignore the reality that lawyers not only facilitate
clients’ life goals but also facilitate the victimization of third persons, some
of whom lack access to lawyers and therefore cannot redress that
victimization. As a result, these defenses underappreciate how the principle
of neutrality will interact with the problem of economic inequality to
reproduce and even aggravate the socioeconomic imbalances that plague the
market for legal services.
II. MANDATORY ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
But it is not just that the leading defenses of the standard conception
underappreciate how the neutrality principle will interact with economic
inequality to exacerbate inequality. They also fail to consider the possibility
that this interaction can lead to the systematic deprivation of individuals’
access to lawyers. This Part provides one concrete example, among many,51
of such an interaction. Approximately sixty million employees, representing
an estimated 56 percent of the nonunion private sector workforce,52 are
covered by employer-promulgated predispute mandatory arbitration
agreements (MAAs), which have been imposed as a condition of new or
continuing employment.53 MAAs require employees to waive their right to
file all statutory and common-law employment-related claims in court even
before they have or know they have claims.54 As will be argued below,
lawyers, who adhere to the principle of neutrality55 and facilitate the
implementation of MAAs for their employer-clients, are foreclosing
employees’ access to lawyers and the law and undermining their autonomy.
Although the Federal Arbitration Act56 (FAA) was passed in 1925 to
provide an alternative forum for the fair and efficient resolution of

51. See infra note 115.
52. ALEXANDER J. S. COLVIN, ECON. POLICY INST., THE GROWING USE OF MANDATORY
ARBITRATION 5 (2017), http://www.epi.org/files/pdf/135056.pdf [https://perma.cc/YHQ2Y8UU]. This estimate excludes those categories of agreements listed in infra note 53, as well
as unionized workplaces, which constitute less than 7 percent of the private sector. Jean R.
Sternlight, Disarming Employees: How American Employers Are Using Mandatory
Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1309, 1313 (2015).
53. As with most of the literature on the subject, this Article excludes from the definition
of MAAs (i) individually negotiated arbitration agreements, typically entered into by highsalaried professional or managerial employees; (ii) collective bargaining agreements; and (iii)
postdispute agreements to arbitrate. These excluded agreements are “more likely to be a
mutually beneficial alternative to either litigation or labor-management strife.” Cynthia
Estlund, The Black Hole of Mandatory Arbitration, 96 N.C. L. REV. 679, 683 (2018).
54. See Sternlight, supra note 52, at 1310 n.7.
55. This Article adopts the assumption that corporate lawyers adhere to the principle of
neutrality, albeit sometimes unconsciously, which operates to favor their clients’ self-serving
understandings of their own interests. See generally Sung Hui Kim, Naked Self-Interest?: Why
the Legal Profession Resists Gatekeeping, 63 FLA. L. REV. 129 (2011).
56. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2018).
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commercial disputes,57 it has been reinterpreted over the last few decades in
unprecedented ways to divest employees of their legal rights. The most
relevant history begins in 1991, when the U.S. Supreme Court opened the
door to mandatory arbitration of nonunion employment claims in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.58 In Gilmer, the Court held that a broker
could be compelled to arbitrate his age discrimination claim against his
brokerage firm pursuant to an arbitration clause embedded in a standard stock
exchange registration form.59 The broker was required to sign this form as a
condition of registering as a member of the stock exchange.60 While Gilmer
did not involve an employment contract per se,61 the decision’s applicability
to a statutory claim that typically arises in the employment context
emboldened employers to adopt MAAs for their own workforce.62
Any lingering doubts about whether courts would apply the FAA to
employment settings were dispelled in 2001. In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams,63 the Court clarified that employers could require their employees to
arbitrate their claims against employers, despite language in the FAA that
had long been thought to foreclose the arbitration of employment-related
claims.64 After Circuit City, however, it remained unclear whether
employers could use MAAs to compel a waiver of the right to participate in
class or group actions. This right had long been seen as critical because
minimum wage, overtime, or unfair wage claims brought by low-wage
employees or involving incremental pay disparities under the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 193865 (FLSA) or the Equal Pay Act of 196366 rely on the
ability to aggregate multiple small recovery claims as the only feasible means
of justifying the costs of litigation and thus of securing legal representation.67
In 2011 and 2013, in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion68 and American
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,69 the Court enforced group action
57. KATHERINE V. W. STONE & ALEXANDER J. S. COLVIN, ECON. POLICY INST., THE
ARBITRATION EPIDEMIC 7 (2015), https://www.epi.org/files/2015/arbitration-epidemic.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VM62-7LAA] (noting that the “drafters, legislators, and advocates of the
FAA assumed that the statute applied only to business disputes”).
58. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
59. Id. at 23–35.
60. Id. at 23.
61. See STONE & COLVIN, supra note 57, at 10 (noting that the arbitration clause was
embedded “in a contract between an employee and the agency with which the employee was
required to register to get the job”).
62. Sternlight, supra note 52, at 1317.
63. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
64. Id. at 109 (interpreting the FAA exemption for “contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce”
to include only employees involved in the physical movement of goods across state lines).
65. Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29
U.S.C.).
66. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2018).
67. See Estlund, supra note 53, at 695; Sternlight, supra note 52, at 1347.
68. 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (enforcing a class action waiver in a boilerplate consumer
contract).
69. 570 U.S. 228 (2013) (enforcing a group action waiver in a merchant credit card
agreement).
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waivers in nonemployee contexts against challenges under a state’s
unconscionability doctrine and federal antitrust law.70 Finally, in 2018, in
Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis,71 the Court enforced group action waivers
against employees, rejecting the argument that such waivers violated
employees’ right to engage in “concerted activities for the purpose of . . .
mutual aid or protection,” as provided for by the National Labor Relations
Act.72 With Epic Systems, the Court basically eliminated the only means for
certain types of employment claims to be vindicated in any forum. Epic
Systems is expected to accelerate the already growing trend of employers
incorporating group action waivers in their MAAs. As of 2017, an estimated
24.7 million private-sector, nonunion employees are subject to group action
waivers contained in arbitration clauses.73
Many aspects of the private arbitration of employment disputes are
troubling. Enforceable arbitration clauses are often embedded in contracts
of adhesion, written in fine print, neither negotiated nor signed, and neither
known nor understood by employees.74 There is no external regulation of
private arbitration to ensure that arbitrators are qualified and impartial,
despite the concern voiced by academics and journalists that employers
overwhelmingly benefit from a structural, “repeat player” advantage over
employees.75 As commentators have long observed, private arbitration is
afflicted with a pro-employer bias, delivering second-class justice to
employees subject to them.76 Moreover, it is difficult to ascertain what type
of second-class justice private arbitration delivers, as there is almost no
transparency in arbitral forums.77 Most importantly, for purposes of this
Article, MAAs threaten to deprive employees of access to law by eroding
their ability to obtain legal representation.
A recent empirical analysis of available data, performed by Cynthia
Estlund, suggests that MAAs are systematically suppressing the filing of
meritorious employment claims, even in arbitration,78 a conclusion also
reached by other employment law experts.79 As a starting point for Estlund’s
analysis, in 2016, an estimated 5126 employment cases were filed in
70. Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 233–37; Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 338–43.
71. 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
72. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2018).
73. COLVIN, supra note 52, at 6.
74. Sternlight, supra note 52, at 1320–22.
75. See STONE & COLVIN, supra note 57, at 22–23. See generally Lisa B. Bingham,
Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189 (1997).
76. Katherine V. W. Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The
Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017, 1046 (1996).
77. Estlund, supra note 53, at 685, 687–88; see also Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes:
The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124
YALE L.J. 2804, 2932–33 (2015) (also noting the eroding transparency of litigation).
78. Estlund, supra note 53, at 690–93.
79. See Alexander J. S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case
Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 6 (2011); J. Maria Glover,
Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 YALE L.J. 3052, 3091–92
(2015); Resnik, supra note 77, at 2936; David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration:
The New Rules, 87 IND. L.J. 239, 240 (2012); Sternlight, supra note 52, at 1313–14.
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arbitration by the approximately sixty million employees covered by
MAAs.80 By comparison, in the same year, an estimated 26,300 employment
cases were filed in federal courts.81 For state courts of general jurisdiction,
the volume of filings is notoriously difficult to verify; however, one analysis,
based on two large studies of state court litigation, concluded that
approximately 195,000 employment suits are filed each year in state courts.82
If we reflect the fact that a significant subset of the federal filings represent
federal class or collective actions under the FLSA, then the estimated number
of federal and state court filings in 2016 would balloon to a conservative
estimate of approximately 571,300 cases.83
Extrapolating from that figure, Estlund estimates that one would have
expected anywhere between 320,000 and 727,000 arbitration cases filed for
the year,84 instead of the estimated 5126 that appear to have been filed.85
What this means is that between 315,000 and 722,000 arbitrations in 2016
were likely “missing”—that is, between 315,000 and 722,000 employment
claims were suppressed by virtue of being subject to MAAs.86 In other
words, it is possible that less than 2 percent of the employment claims that
one would expect to be filed in any forum, but that are covered by MAAs,
end up being filed in arbitration.87 As a result, the “overwhelming majority
of claims that would have been litigated but for the presence of an MAA are
simply dropped without being filed in any forum at all.”88 As Estlund
concludes, “[m]andatory arbitration is less of an ‘alternative dispute
resolution’ mechanism than it is a . . . black hole into which matter collapses
and no light escapes.”89
The most likely explanation for the significantly lower filing rates in
arbitration is that lawyers are dramatically less willing to represent employee
claims that are destined for arbitration rather than for litigation. To be sure,
it is important not to overstate the ability of employees, who are not subject
to MAAs, to find lawyers. Indeed, only about 10 percent of employees
seeking lawyers for litigation actually succeed in finding representation.90
Because employees ordinarily cannot afford to pay legal fees at hourly rates
out of pocket, especially if they have just lost their jobs, they must obtain
legal representation on a contingent fee basis, whereby the lawyer only
recovers if the plaintiff prevails. In fact, most plaintiff-side employment
lawyers represent the bulk of their clients on a partially or entirely contingent
fee basis.91 Contingent fee arrangements are known to discourage lawyers
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Estlund, supra note 53, at 690–93.
Id. at 691–93.
Id. at 693–94 (citing studies).
Id. at 695–96.
Id. at 696.
Id. at 692.
Id. at 697 fig.2.
Id. at 696.
Id. at 698.
Id. at 682.
Id. at 702 (citing a study).
See STONE & COLVIN, supra note 57, at 21 (citing a study).
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from taking on employment claims with low expected recoveries, even if
they are meritorious.92 Such claims may be riskier to win on the merits (e.g.,
they lack “smoking gun” evidence); they may require substantial upfront
cash expenditures (e.g., due to the case being factually complex or requiring
statistical proof or expert testimony); or the financial recoveries at stake may
be relatively small (e.g., the plaintiff is a low-wage employee).93 The same
general dynamic is magnified for private arbitration because MAAs can
further lower the expected recoveries of employment claims, impairing the
economic feasibility for plaintiffs’ lawyers to bring such claims.
One way in which MAAs further lower expected recoveries is by
incorporating provisions that impede the full and fair adjudication of
otherwise valid claims. Those provisions may
bar the claim altogether (like a very short limitations period or unaffordable
arbitrator fees), or impede investigation (like very limited discovery), or
sharply skew proceedings against the complainant (like a biased arbitrator
pool or a skewed selection process), or curtail recovery even in the event
of “success” (like provisions against attorney fee shifting or punitive
damages, or damage limits).94

Group action waivers, as noted above, make certain employment claims
economically infeasible for plaintiffs’ lawyers to take on.95 Even if a
provision is vague or potentially invalid, it can still deter lawyers from
representing the claim in the first place. After all, any challenges to an
arbitration agreement will likely be decided by the arbitral forum itself, and
arbitrators are likely to strike and sever the invalid portion, rather than
invalidate the entire MAA.96
Even without the baggage of particularly prohibitive or especially unfair
provisions, the expected recoveries on claims in arbitration will generally be
lower than those in litigation and often below the threshold of economic
viability for plaintiffs’ lawyers. Expected recoveries are, of course, based on
lawyers’ estimates of actual recoveries. The limited data available suggest
that not only are actual recoveries significantly lower in arbitration (than in
litigation)97 but also that employees are less likely to prevail in arbitration
and recover anything.98 Much less is known about pro se employeeclaimants, but existing studies on pro se claimants in other contexts suggest

92. See Sternlight, supra note 52, at 1335–36.
93. Id. at 1336.
94. Estlund, supra note 53, at 700–01.
95. See supra notes 64–72 and accompanying text.
96. Estlund, supra note 53, at 701. Moreover, courts have the power under the separability
doctrine to find valid arbitration clauses in invalid contracts. See STONE & COLVIN, supra note
57, at 9.
97. Alexander J. D. Colvin & Mark D. Gough, Individual Employment Rights Arbitration
in the United States: Actors and Outcomes, 68 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 1019, 1028 tbl.1
(2015).
98. Estlund, supra note 53, at 688 (citing studies reporting comparatively lower success
rates in arbitration).
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that they fare even worse.99 As Estlund concludes, “it looks as though the
presence of a mandatory arbitration provision dramatically reduces an
employee’s chance of securing legal representation, as well as her chance of
any kind of recovery, any kind of hearing, or any formal complaint being
filed on her behalf.”100
If MAAs have the claim-suppressive effect that a growing chorus of
experts believe they do,101 then the lawyers who adhere to the principle of
neutrality and facilitate MAAs for their employer-clients are complicit,
wittingly or not, in the foreclosure of employees’ access to lawyers.
Accordingly, those lawyers are facilitating the systematic divestment of
employees’ legal rights—statutory and common-law rights that are supposed
to be nonwaivable as a matter of positive law.102 And those divested rights,
such as the right to be free of discrimination and sexual harassment, the right
to be free of lie-detector tests and retaliation for whistleblowing, and the right
to be paid a fair wage and provided a safe and healthful workplace,103 are not
trivial. They are rights “constitutive of civil society,” and they are intended
to safeguard the autonomy and equal dignity of citizens with respect to the
nonelective activity of earning a living.104
Moreover, this systematic divestment of critical legal rights cannot be
easily remedied. Even assuming that an employee is lucky enough to secure
pro bono representation before the employment relationship is formed (and
before the MAA is imposed), it is highly unlikely that bargaining power
dynamics would be altered such that an employer would agree to relinquish
its MAA. And reliance on pro bono representation to pursue a claim in
arbitration will rarely be worth the effort, considering that most lawyers lack
the training to competently handle employment disputes.105 Also, walking
away from the employment relationship will not be a realistic option for
many employees, as MAAs are becoming the norm for some industries, such
as the national restaurant chain and retail industries.106 And Congress is
99. Russel Engler, Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data
Reveal About When Counsel Is Most Needed, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 37, 44–66 (2010)
(reviewing studies).
100. Estlund, supra note 53, at 702–03.
101. See supra note 79.
102. See Estlund, supra note 53, at 703.
103. MAAs generally bar access to courts for claims arising under the Civil Rights Act of
1866, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Equal Pay
Act of 1963, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, the Employee Retirement
Security Act of 1974, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, and
“any other federal, state or local statute, regulation or common law doctrine, regarding
employment discrimination, conditions of employment or termination of employment.” E.
PATRICK MCDERMOTT & ARTHUR ELIOT BERKELEY, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN
THE WORKPLACE: CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES FOR HUMAN RESOURCE EXECUTIVES AND THEIR
COUNSEL 110–11 (1996).
104. See Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate: A Threat to the Rule of Law?, in PRIVATE LAW
AND THE RULE OF LAW 288, 296 (Lisa M. Austin & Dennis Klimchuk eds., 2014).
105. Cf. Abel, supra note 45, at 686 (“[M]ost lawyers lack the training to qualify them to
represent pro bono clients.”).
106. STONE & COLVIN, supra note 57, at 15.
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unlikely to move anytime soon to overrule Supreme Court precedent or
meaningfully regulate private arbitration.
Finally, lobbying for
comprehensive law reform, though welcomed, is likely futile, as employers
have far superior economic resources than advocates for employee rights.
This example demonstrates how the interaction between the principle of
neutrality and the problem of economic inequality can lead to the wholesale
divestment of fundamental legal rights of the have-nots. What is more, this
outcome was accomplished by depriving individuals of their access to
lawyers, which—according to some defenses of the standard conception—is
critical for supporting the autonomy of persons.107 Therefore, those lawyers,
who are promoting their clients’ goals consistently with the principle of
neutrality, are not only depriving individuals of access to the law but are also
undermining their autonomy—the very value that defenders of the standard
conception claim to embrace. Unless these defenders can offer persuasive
reasons why supporting the autonomy of one’s own clients morally justifies
depriving others of their autonomy,108 the autonomy-based justifications
must fail on their own terms.
III. AUTONOMY REDUX
Unfortunately, what is being countenanced is actually far worse than
merely trading off one person’s autonomy for another’s. Lawyers’
promotion of clients’ autonomy at the expense of others’ cannot be regarded
as an equivalent exchange. There are, after all, multiple conceptions of
autonomy, with some considerably weightier than others. What in fact is
being condoned when lawyers facilitate the promulgation of MAAs is the
promotion of a weaker form of autonomy at the expense of a more
fundamental form of autonomy.
When defenders of the standard conception assert that lawyers enhance the
autonomy of clients by facilitating clients’ lawful objectives, they are
referring to the freedom to do what one wants—choosing freely without
external constraints.109 This particular understanding of autonomy is nothing
less than the dominant, negative conception of liberty110 at the heart of the
107. See supra notes 18–23 and accompanying text.
108. Distinguishing between “personal wrongs” and institutional wrongs, Fried argued that
lawyers are morally entitled to commit institutional wrongs, provided they act in a “formal,
representative way” because the legal system has “authorize[d] both the injustice . . . and the
formal gesture for working it.” Fried, supra note 12, at 1084. In my view, these arguments
“put[] too much faith in existing legal institutions and too much faith in procedure at the
expense of substantive justice.” See David Luban, Misplaced Fidelity, 90 TEX. L. REV. 673,
678 (2012).
109. This meaning of autonomy is gleaned solely from the works described in the text of
Part I. Of course, it is possible that those authors today hold more complex understandings of
autonomy as expressed in other works. See, e.g., Stephen L. Pepper, Autonomy, Community,
and Lawyers’ Ethics, 19 CAP. U. L. REV. 939, 944 (1990).
110. See ISAIAH BERLIN, TWO CONCEPTIONS OF LIBERTY 7 (1969) (identifying positive and
negative conceptions of freedom); see also THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 262 (C. B.
Macpherson ed., Penguin Books 1968) (1651) (“A Free-Man, is he, that in those things, which
by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindred to doe what he has a will to.”).
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classical liberal tradition—the notion that people are free simply to the extent
that their choices are not interfered with: “to be free, more or less, is to be
left alone to do whatever one pleases: to not be blocked by the obstructions
of others and, in most versions, to not be burdened by their coercive
threats.”111 Because Fried, Pepper, Freedman, and Smith apparently
consider the freedom to act without interference as a preeminent moral value,
they regard any constraints imposed by lawyers on clients’ ends, beyond the
minimum demanded by positive law, to be an undue infringement on clients’
autonomy.112 Accordingly, lawyers must promote their clients’ freedom—
understood as noninterference—by maximizing clients’ lawful goals.
There is, however, an alternative conception of autonomy that is
implicated when employees are divested of their critical legal rights. An
individual enjoys this more fundamental form of autonomy only insofar as
she is not dominated or subordinated by others. And she is not dominated
by others only insofar as she is protected by laws, institutions, and social
norms against the arbitrary exercise of power over her with respect to a
socially defined set of fundamental life choices.113 This alternative
understanding of autonomy is nothing less than the classical republican
notion of freedom—understood as nondomination.114
When lawyers help employers deprive employees of critical legal rights
by promulgating MAAs, they are not merely constraining employees’ free
exercise of choice. Rather, they are dismantling the legal and institutional
protections intended to secure employees’ freedom from domination by their
employers. Devoid of protections that safeguard their free and equal status
as citizens vis-à-vis the fundamental activity of earning a living, employees
become exposed to the arbitrary exercise of their employers’ power. And,
undeterred and unconstrained by laws that protect the basic liberties to be
free from discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in the workplace,
employers are more or less free to exercise arbitrary power over their
employees—i.e., they are free to do as they please with their employees. By
promoting their employer-clients’ free exercise of choice, lawyers are
undermining employees’ freedom from domination at the hands of their
employers.115 Those employees are rendered second-class citizens.
111. Frank Lovett & Philip Pettit, Neorepublicanism: A Normative and Institutional
Research Program, 12 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 11, 14 (2009).
112. See supra Part I.
113. Lovett & Pettit, supra note 111, at 17.
114. See Frank Lovett, Republicanism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (June 4, 2018),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/republicanism/ [https://perma.cc/KN8H-MVKQ]. For other
works on republicanism and legal ethics, see, for example, Robert W. Gordon, The
Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 14 (1998); Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the
Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics Codes, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241, 241 (1992).
115. One might object that the alternative is worse—that if lawyers refuse to facilitate
privately minted commands, then lawyers would be dominating clients. This objection
confuses domination and interference. For the distinction, see Lovett & Pettit, supra note 111,
at 14. Whether such interference in the form of refusal is morally problematic depends (partly)
on whether (and the degree to which) the client’s intended project is morally problematic. See
Luban, supra note 31, at 641–43.
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CONCLUSION
Far from mitigating the problem of economic inequality that afflicts our
socioeconomic, political, and legal systems, the standard conception of the
lawyer’s role can and does exacerbate it. Not merely entrenching power,
lawyers—by simply doing what they routinely do when they privately order
their clients’ affairs—can amplify power, potentially undermining the
autonomy and equal dignity of individuals. Unfortunately, the example
discussed herein is not an isolated one, as there are numerous contexts in
which lawyers have deprived individuals of their critical legal rights.116
Indeed, the systemic nature of this problem suggests that systemic
solutions—not piecemeal legislative band-aids—are needed. To that end,
this Article calls for an alternative model of legal ethics based not on thin
versions of autonomy heretofore embraced but on a more demanding
conceptualization of autonomy based on the value of freedom as
nondomination.

116. Other potential examples of this type of interaction include defendant-friendly forumselection clauses, waivers of the right to sue, and nondisclosure clauses used in the settlement
of mass tort and sexual assault claims. Regardless of their enforceability, such provisions
deter the filing of at least some meritorious claims.

